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An Analysis  of Policy  Changes  in the
Canadian Feed Grain Market
A.  B.  Hickson and C. A.  Carter
This paper  examines changes  in the welfare of Canadian barley and livestock
producers attributable  to a substantial alteration  of Canadian domestic  feed grain
policy in  1974. Three welfare  effects are determined-institutional,  destabilization,
and risk response.  Generally, the analytical results confirmed  initial hypotheses,  with
the exclusion of a positive relationship  between  price risk and barley production  on
the Prairies. This positive relationship,  theorized to result  from the risk reduction
effect of yearly stabilized Canadian  Wheat Board initial prices,  enhanced the welfare
benefits of the policy change.
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The objective  of this paper is to examine  the
effects  of altered  policy parameters  within  a
market  on the  welfare  of the market  partici-
pants. The usual method of solely examining
the  direct effects  of the  policy  change  is  ex-
tended by considering the indirect effect of al-
tered price risk structures accruable  to the in-
stitutional change.  The case considered is the
Canadian  feed  grain  market,  which  experi-
enced a fundamental  change  in policy during
the mid-1970s. As a prelude to the analysis, it
is necessary  to provide some  background  on
the characteristics  of this market.
Characteristics of the Canadian Feed
Grain Market
The  most important  feed grain in  Canada is
barley, accounting on average (1974/75-1984/
85)  for  40% of Canadian  requirements.  Corn
(25%), oats  (21%),  and lower grades of wheat
(14%) meet the balance of Canadian livestock
feed requirements.  In  a regional context,  the
bulk of barley,  oat, and  wheat production  is
concentrated  on the Prairies  (Manitoba,  Sas-
katchewan,  and Alberta),  while corn  produc-
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tion is predominant  in climatically  more  fa-
vourable eastern Canada (Ontario, Quebec, and
the  Atlantic  provinces).'  The  importance  of
corn  production  in eastern  Canada is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, with production in-
creasing by 270% over the last two decades.
In terms of regional structure,  the Canadian
feed grain market may be characterized  by a
feed grain surplus  region,  the Prairies, and  a
deficit region,  eastern Canada. The surplus re-
gion produces sufficient amounts of feed grain
to meet its needs and those in eastern Canada
and also allow for exports.
Within this framework there have been sev-
eral policy alterations  which have  affected the
participants  within  the  market.  Key  among
these policy changes was a substantial redefin-
ing of institutional  roles  within  the  market,
attributable to the adoption  of the Domestic
Feed Grains Policy (DFP) in 1974. This policy
led to a substantial reduction in the role of the
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) in the domestic
market. Prior to  1974 the  CWB  was the sole
supplier of feed wheat, oats, and barley inter-
provincially  within  Canada,  including  any
transactions  between  provinces  within  the
Prairie  Provinces.  The  DFP,  in reducing  the
CWB's role, expanded that of the private grain
trade, making them equal competitors for sales
For simplicity,  British  Columbia,  a  small feed deficit  region,
has been excluded from  the analysis.
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anywhere  within  Canada.2 At  the same  time
the policy enhanced  the role of the Winnipeg
Commodity Exchange  (WCE) from its former
mandate of being utilized for price  discovery
and risk reduction purposes by the private trade
on  intraprovincial  sales,  and  at times by the
CWB to hedge domestic sales,  to a more pre-
dominant role in domestic  price formation.
Why was this policy change  undertaken?  A
key factor in this change was widespread  dis-
content  with  the  effectiveness  of feed  grain
marketing  systems,  in particular  as  they im-
pacted barley pricing in the Prairie Provinces
during the early  1970s.  Several  studies (Can-
ada Grains  Council) are available which  out-
line the details of this discontent;  however,  it
may be  summarized in terms of several phe-
nomena:  (a) widespread  belief that the  CWB
did not  actively  pursue  sales  (export or  do-
mestic)  of barley,  (b) an  increase  of on farm
inventories of barley in the Prairie region (from
47 million bushels on average  1964/65-1968/
69 to 95 million bushels on average 1969/70-
1973/74), and (c) cash flow problems for barley
producers  which resulted in distress sales and
illegal  "bootleg"  sales  of barley  across  inter-
provincial borders.
In terms of grain production on the Prairies,
the result of these phenomena was a declining
emphasis  on  the  production  of barley.  The
consequence was that farm management  skill
and expertise  was redirected  toward alterna-
tive crops.  In  a sense  this was  an attitudinal
2  The  CWB still had sole jurisdiction  over export and domestic
human food sales.
effect which could be expected to have yielded
inefficient  technological  and  resource  alloca-
tion in barley production.
The Effects  of the Domestic  Feed
Grains Policy
The altered direction  of Canadian feed grains
policy  is hypothesized to have manifested it-
self in three ways:  (a) via an institutional im-
pact-solely  the  effect  of removing  any  per-
ceived  or  real  constraints  to  feed  grain
production and marketing; (b) through an im-
pact on the variability of eastern consumption
of Prairie-produced feed grains (this destabili-
zation effect is intertwined closely with changes
in feed grain  production  in eastern  Canada);
and (c) by impacting the variability of prices-
a price risk response  effect.
In the first case, statistical information as a
source  of initial  testing  of the  hypothesis  is
quite scant. However, there is widespread  an-
ecdotal  evidence  available  from  the  period
when discussions regarding the policy were un-
derway in the early  1970s. In terms of an eco-
nomic model of the Canadian feed grains mar-
ket, this impact is shown in figure  1, where SP
is the supply of feed grains on the Prairies,  Dp
is the demand for feed grains on the Prairies,
SE is the supply of feed grains in eastern Can-
ada, DE is the demand for feed grains in eastern
Canada, and DX is the export demand for Ca-
nadian feed grains. Assuming that macroeco-
nomic  conditions  impacting  the  feed  grain














Figure 1.  The institutional effect
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(thou. tonnes)  644  700
Coefficient  of variation  (%)  19  14
Western  Canada
Mean consumption
(thou.  tonnes)  3,958  3,511
Coefficient  of variation  (%)  4  34
Source:  Statistics Canada,  Grain Trade of Canada 22-201.
a Based  on Feed Freight Assisted  shipments.
the institutional change resulted in the Prairie
supply curve shifting from Sp to Sp'. This shift
resulted from the adoption of a more efficient
production  regime  in  response  to the attitu-
dinal  change  of producers  toward  feed grain
production.  For  eastern  producers  the  insti-
tutional change  resulted in a shift backwards
from SE to  SEI,  a less  efficient production  re-
gime,  in response  to the expectation  of more
competition in their market. Depending on the
relative  size of the shifts,  the  trade price, P,





this case it is postulated that the shifts yielded
a decline in price, from PT to P'.  The welfare
of barley  producers  and  livestock  producers
changed  as follows:  (a) Prairie barley produc-
ers gained HUPT - G VPT; (b) Prairie livestock
producers  gained  IXPT  - IWP,;  (c) eastern
barley  producers  lost  AMP,  - LNPI; (d)
eastern  livestock  producers  gained  KOP'  -
KQPrI.
Table  1 shows the impact  of the  change  in
DFP  on  the  quantity  of  Prairie  barley  de-
manded in eastern Canada. Prior to the change
in policy mean annual consumption (1963/64-
1973/74) of Prairie barley marketed in eastern
Canada  through  the  commercial  system  in
Canada  was  700,000  tonnes  compared  with
644,000  tonnes  after (1974/75-1984/85)  the
policy change-a decline of 8%. In spite of this
decline  in  consumption,  its  variability  in-
creased  by  nearly  36%.3 Comparatively,  the
consumption of barley within western Canada
over the same two periods grew by 13%, while
the variability  fell by 88%.
Utilizing  the  expansion  of Massell's  argu-
ment, as formulated by Bieri and Schmitz, the
effect of this increased instability is shown in
3 Part of this increased variability may have been ascribable to
more  variable eastern  Canadian feed  grain production.  As a test
of this hypothesis,  the correlation  coefficient between  feed freight
assisted  shipments  and  eastern  feed  grain  production,  in  corn




Figure 2.  The destabilization  effect
Table  1.  Consumption
Barley  in Canada
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Figure 3.  Utility  and price
figure  2. Destabilizing eastern demand,  DE, to
two  equally  probable  demand  curves,  DEH
and DEL results in a welfare loss in eastern Can-
ada of (R +  S)/2. At  the same  time,  Prairie
producers  gain  1/2(PTHBUPI  - P IUDPTL)
and  Prairie  livestock  producers  gained
/2(PTIXCPTL - PTIXAPTH).
Similarly,  price  variability  within  the  Ca-
nadian  market  increased  subsequent  to  the
policy change  as shown in table 2, partly  as a
result  of the  increasing  instability  of eastern
Canadian  demand.  Over the  ten-year period
subsequent to 1974/75, the coefficient of vari-
ation  for world  coarse grain  prices,  as repre-
sented by Chicago Board of Trade corn prices,
increased by 20%. Canadian feed grain prices,
typified  by  WCE  barley  futures,  had  a  68%
increase  in variability  over the same two  pe-
riods.  What was the impact  of this change  in
price risk for Canadian barley producers  and
consumers?
The price risk response  effect can be devel-
oped  out of the work  of Sandmo.  Assuming
that output prices  are risky, it was  shown by
Sandmo that the appropriate  output level was
V'(q)  ,
where  V'(q) is marginal  cost, g is mean of the
risky  prices,  and  q is  the  output  level.  This
level  of output can be compared  with that in
the riskless case by examining utility curve of
a risk-averse producer  (fig.  3). If the producer
has the choice of two equally likely risky prices
Table 2.  Canadian Versus World Price Vari-
ability
Mean Price  Coefficient  of
($Cdn./bushel)  Variation
Post Change in DFP
WCE barley  2.52  23.0
Chicago corn  2.76  17.5
Prior to Change in DFP
WCE barley  1.91  13.7
Chicago corn  1.32  14.6
Source:  Statistics Canada, Grain  Trade of Canada
Chicago Board  of Trade,  Statistical Annual.
P1 and P2or the certain price P, the choice will
be the riskless  price because the utility  at the
riskless price is higher for all points along chord
AB.  To  induce  production  the  riskless  price
would have to fall from P to P3, equating risk-
less and risky utility.  However, since P3 is less
than P, output  at P is greater than output at
P3. Because  output at  P3 equals  the  level  of
output at A,  output in the riskless case is greater
than that in the risky case.
If the relative  price-risk  level  for the pro-
ducer changes, output will increase,  decrease,
or remain the same depending on the magni-
tude of the change in risk and the shape of the
utility curve.  Assume that  producers are  risk
averters and prices are stabilized at P = AL.  The
result, due to the lower risk is that the supply
curve  will  shift outward.  Conversely,  if sup-
pliers are risk averters  and prices  are less sta-
ble, the  supply curve would shift inward.
In terms of the Canadian feed grain market,
assuming  risk-averse  behavior,  it is hypothe-
sized  that the  increased  risk in prices  subse-
quent to the introduction of the DFP only im-
pacted  Prairie  producers,  yielding  a shift  in
their supply curve inward from Sp' to Sp  (fig.
4).  For the  market participants the effects  on
welfare  were (a) Prairie barley producers  lost
HUP I - FYP  , (b) Prairie livestock produc-
ers lost IXPT' - IZP  R,  (c) eastern barley pro-
ducers gained LJP?  - LNPT', and (d) eastern
livestock producers  lost KOPT  - KEPT.
Analytical  Procedures
The determination  of the magnitude  (Willig)
of the three preceding  effects  was undertaken
utilizing an  econometric  model of the Cana-
dian  barley  market.  The  model consisted  of
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three  sectors-Prairies,  eastern  Canada,  ex-
ports,  and one national market clearing iden-
tity.  Each equation  contained deflated  barley
and competitive grain prices along with binary
variables to isolate the institutional effect, and
other policy changes  (quotas, changes  in Feed
Freight Assistance,4 and  changes  in transpor-
tation  constraints)  which  could  contaminate
the results.  Consumptive livestock units were
included on the demand  side of the model to
represent  changes  in regional feed  consump-
tion. Price risk was incorporated into the mod-
el employing the mean-variance criterion (To-
bin). In order to eliminate the impact of yield
risk from the model, the supply equations were
estimated  in terms  of seeded  areas while  de-
mand was based on actual demand, in bushels,
converted to an acreage equivalent by dividing
by yearly yields.
To assure that the results of the analysis were
not biased because of the simultaneous  nature
of the model, the estimation procedure  select-
ed was two-stage  least  squares.  In practice,  a
variety  of analyses  were  conducted  utilizing
the original formulation of the model (appen-
dix).  Iteratively variables were removed and/
or  redefined,  yielding  the  following  model
which  was utilized  to ascertain  the empirical
measures of the three  effects: 5










=  .76,  d* = 2.06;








=  .57,  d* =  1.06;
(ii)  SE = 976  + 25633DPRB8C
(6.22)  (2.28)
4 For  details of some of these programs  refer to Wilson.




- 8414DPRC8C + 221DFP
(-1.06)  (3.53)
R
2 =  .78,  d*= 1.00;




+  .1 16LNE - 359FFA
(6.09)  (-3.31)
R2 =  .77,  d* =  1.83;
(v)  D  =  -7162  + 43900DPBU  + .059LSU
(-1.81)  (1.14)  (3.33)
-611  TRANS
(-.84)
R2 =  .45,  d* =  1.66;
v)  SP + SE= DP + DE+  DX,
T= 1(1961/62) to 24 (1984/85).
Generally, the model conformed with initial
expectations,  with  supply being positively  re-
lated to price  and negatively  related to  alter-
native grain prices.  While the level of signifi-
cance,  as interpreted by the t-statistic,  for the
own-price variable and Prairie supply was low,
this appears to have been the result of the high
degree of correlation between DSPRB8C and
DPRB8C. The exclusion  of the former raises
the t-value  for the latter variable  to  1.91.  In
the case of the demand equations,  a negative
relationship was determined between own price
and  demand.  Competitive  grain  prices  were
negatively  related  to demand.  An  expansion
of the livestock herd yielded an increased de-
mand for barley.
In terms of the variables specifically of con-
cern  to  this  analysis,  results  generally  con-
firmed initial hypotheses.  The change in DFP
was positively related to barley production on
the Prairies. However, the level of significance
of this variable, similar to the situation of bar-
ley prices to supply on the Prairies, was some-
what low. This low value results from the in-
terrelationship  of the  price  risk  variable
DSPRB8  C  and the policy change variable DFP.
In the following equation, which  excludes the
variable  DSPRB8C, the level  of significance
of DFP  rises to an acceptable  level:











Figure 4.  The risk response  effect
-2546QUOTA  + 2821DFP.
(-1.98)  (2.66)
On the Prairies the  gains from  less-restricted
interprovincial movement negatively impact-
ed demand from the livestock sector. Contrary
to the initial hypothesis,  the  change  in policy
yielded  an expansion of barley  production in
eastern  Canada.  This  expansion  is likely  ac-
cruable to the belief that the opening up of the
market  would  inhibit  movement  of western
grain to eastern feeders. This would present an
expanded market opportunity for eastern bar-
ley growers.  The  policy change  did not have
an impact  on eastern livestock producers.
The estimated impact of price risk on barley
production on the Prairies was quite different
than expected. Higher price risk was positively
related to barley production. This appears con-
tradictory to a hypothesis  of risk-averse  pro-
ducers.  However,  this is not such an unusual
result if the arguments of Schmitz, Shalit, and
Turnovsky are considered.  Their argument is
based on the premise that if production is con-
sidered in terms of a variety of simultaneous
activities,  one of which is afforded  price risk
protection,  it  is feasible  that the producer  is
willing to accept  price  risk in another  aspect
of his/her  production  portfolio.  For  Prairie
barley producers,  such a production activity is
readily available in terms of wheat production,
which  is  provided  a  guaranteed  floor  price
through the CWB's initial price.
Welfare  Effects
The analytical model was employed in the cal-
culation of the welfare changes due to the three
effects.  The basis of the procedure was to cal-
culate  the  appropriate  intercepts  and  price
equilibria under each effect. As a starting point,
Table 3.  Calculated  Prices ($Cdn.  per bushel)
Intercepts
Eastern  Eastern
Prairie Supply  Prairie  Demand  Canadian  Canadian
(H,  G, F)  (I)  (A, L)  (K)  Trade Prices
Initial  -43.42  9.15  .99  14.10  3.52
Institutional effect  -46.24  8.77  .27  14.10  2.75
Destabilization
High demand  -46.24  8.77  .27  15.97  2.83
Low demand  -46.24  8.77  .27  12.27  2.67
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Table  4.  Estimated  Changes  in  Welfare
(nominal Cdn.  thous. dollars/year)
Market Effect
Institu-  Destabili-  Risk
Sector  tional  zation  Response
Prairie supply  21,866  2  10,657
Prairie demand  2,226  7  1,368
Total prairies  24,092  9  12,025
Eastern Canadian
supply  -38  2  -164
Eastern Canadian
demand  633  -22  195
Total Eastern
Canada  595  -20  31
Total Canada  24,687  -11  12,056
an initialized state prior to the change in policy
was derived,  then each  effect was  assessed  in
relation  to  the  change  from  the  initial  state.
For this  initialization  procedure,  the  exoge-
nous variables in each equation were set equal
to their  mean values  subsequent  to  1974/75,
exclusive  of DSPRB8C, which was  set equal
to its mean  for the  eleven years  prior to the
change  in policy.
For the  institutional  effect  the  calculation
involved the setting of the variable DFP  to 1.
The destabilization  effect  was determined  by
deriving two equally probable eastern demand
curves.  These  two  curves  were  generated  by
establishing  a  95%  confidence  interval  about
the variable LNE -the  high demand curve cal-
culated  utilizing LNE  =  19,147  and the  low
demand  curve  by  utilizing  LNE  =  16,743.
Welfare  with  these  unstable  curves  for  the
market participants was  then compared  with
that  following  the  introduction  of the DFP.
The impact  of price  risk  was  determined  by
setting DSPRB8C =  .001515,  the initial level
plus 71%  of the  change  in this variable  from
the latter eleven years compared with the elev-
en  years  immediately  prior  to  the  policy
change.6 The  price  equilibria  determined  by
this procedure  are shown in table 3.7
6 For the  initial,  institutional,  and  destabilization  effects
DSPRB8C  was  set equal to .001321-the initial level plus  (68 -
20)/20 = 71%  of the change  in level over the 2 periods.
7 The mean  values of the exogeneous variables  were
DPR08C = .023
DPBU = .029
TRANS  = .273




DPRCC  =  .039
QUOTA = .546
LNE = 17,928
Utilizing  these  price  equilibria  the  respec-
tive  welfare effects  are  shown in table 4.  The
change  in the DFP  resulted in an annual wel-
fare  gain  of 21.9  million  dollars  for  Prairie
barley growers and a welfare gain of 2.2 million
dollars for Prairie livestock producers. The gain
to livestock producers  occurred in spite of the
negative  direct effect of the policy  change  on
Prairie  demand.  The  resulting  price  decline
from the  much larger effect  on Prairie supply
lowered prices  sufficiently to yield  benefits to
Prairie  consumers  of barley.  Overall,  the net
gain for the Prairies was $24.1 million per year,
about 35%  of the average production value. In
eastern Canada the  policy  change  resulted  in
a small  loss  to growers  ($.04  million)  and  a
slight  gain  for livestock  producers  ($.6  mil-
lion), yielding a small net benefit.  Overall, for
Canada,  the  policy  change  resulted in yearly
gains for $24.7 million.
The effect of destabilizing eastern Canadian
barley demand was  small,  in spite of the  rel-
atively large  shifts in livestock  numbers.  For
the Prairies the gain from destabilization  was
$9,000, of  which producers gained only $2,000.
In eastern  Canada the  change  in welfare was
$20,000,  a gain  of $2,000  for barley  growers
and a loss of $22,000 for livestock producers.
Overall,  the  welfare  effect  for  all  of Canada
was a loss of $11,000.
The  effect  of the  change  in price  risk  also
resulted in a positive welfare gain for Canada.
Overall, the yearly gain was slightly more than
$12.0  million, the bulk of which was received
on the  Prairies.  Contrary to the hypothesized
results,  these  positive benefits  resulted  from
the positive relationship between price risk and
Prairie  production.  Within  the  regions,  the
main benefactors were Prairie producers,  who
gained  $10.7  million.  Gains for Prairie  live-
stock producers  were  $1.4  million,  while  the
changes  in  eastern  Canada  were  a relatively
small loss  of $.16  million and  a gain  of $.2
million  for  growers  and  consumers,  respec-
tively.
Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
The purpose of this paper was to examine the
welfare consequences of  policy changes on par-
ticipants  in the Canadian  feed grain  market.
The  policy  change  was  the  Domestic  Feed
Grains  Policy  of 1974.  Three  aspects  of the
change  were examined:  the effect of changing
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the institutional framework in the market, the
impact of destabilizing demand in a key con-
stituent of the market,  and the associated im-
pacts of altered prices  due to the change.  The
study found that the institutional change yield-
ed substantial  welfare  benefits  to Canada,  in
particular for Prairie barley growers  and live-
stock producers. In eastern Canada the impact
was not as great although livestock producers
were beneficiaries  of the change.  The  impact
of destabilizing  eastern  Canadian barley  de-
mand was very  small,  yielding only nominal
changes  to  welfare.  The  impact  of increased
price risk yielded a gain in welfare for Canada.
This  result  was  contradictory  to original  ex-
pectations,  arising  primarily  because  of the
beneficial  aspects  of wheat price  stabilization
via CWB  initial prices on the Prairies.
The foregoing results suggest several impor-
tant considerations  for policy. First, it is evi-
dent from the positive relationship of  price risk
to barley  supply  on the Prairies  that a policy
of complete (i.e., removing any elements of the
private trade) price stabilization policy is mis-
directed,  simply  because it has  not been  ap-
parent that such policies consider the portfolio
aspect of interrelated production activities.
A second implication of the study stems from
the relatively  small losses experienced  by de-
stabilizing eastern Canadian livestock produc-
tion.  While  the  focus  of this  study  was  not
directly on  this  sector,  it would  appear  that
these small losses do not support even the ad-
ministrative expenses of stabilizing this sector.
Finally, the  increase  in societal  welfare  at-
tributable solely to the removal of institutional
restrictions in the market suggests that less in-
tervention in the market, particularly for other
Prairie-produced  grains, may yield further so-
cietal benefits.  While in this case the study is
sector  specific,  it could logically  be extended
to other economic activities  which are  under
a similar institutional regime.
[Received November 1985; final revision
received May 1987.]
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Appendix
Definitions
Sp  =  Ao  +  A1DPRB8C  -A 2DSPRB8C  -
A3DWBPW  - A4DPR08C  +  A5DFP -
A6QUOTA - A7LIFT + e,
D  =  Bo  - BDRPBC + B2DPROC + B3DPRWC
+ B4LNW  + BDFP + e2
SE  =  Co  +  C1DPRB8C  - C2DPR08C  -
C3DPRC8C - C4DFP + e 3
DE =  Do - D 1DPRBC + D2DPRCC + D3DPROC
+ D4LNE - D5FFA + e4
Dx =  Eo  + EDPBU  + E2LSU - E3TRANS  + e 5
Sp  +  SE = D  + DE + Dx
T  =  1960/61  to  1984/85
Variable Definitions
Sp  Supply of feed grains on the Prairies
Dp  Demand for feed grains on the Prairies
SE  Supply of feed grains in eastern Canada
DE  Demand for feed grains in eastern Can-
ada
Dx  Export demand for Canadian feed grains
DPRBC  Deflated crop year WCE price of barley
DPRB8C  Deflated (August-March) WCE price of
barley
DSPRB8C Deflated standard deviation of  (August-
March) WCE price of barley
DPROC  Deflated crop year WCE price of oats
DPR08C  Deflated (August-March) WCE price of
oats
DPRWC  Deflated  crop year  WCE price  of feed
wheat
DPRCC  Deflated crop year price of corn in east-
ern Canada
DPRC8C  Deflated  (August-March)  price  of corn
in eastern Canada
DWBPW  Deflated CWB initial price plus the pre-
vious year's final payment for wheat
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DPBU  Deflated  price  of barley  at Duluth  (in
$Cdn. per bushel)
LSE  Livestock numbers in eastern Canada in
milk cow equivalents
LSW  Livestock  numbers  on  the  Prairies  in
milk cow equivalents
LSU  Pig and cattle numbers in the USSR in
milk cow equivalents
DFP  Binary variable  for the change  in DFP,
DFP  = 1 since  1974/75
FFA  Binary variable for the change in Feed
Freight Assistance Policy, FFA = 1 since
1975/76
QUOTA  Binary  variable  for  the  imposition  of
quotas on feed grains, QUOTA = 1 since
1979/80
TRANS  Binary variable  for years  in which  ex-
ports were constrained by the transpor-
tation  system  (including  strikes  and
lockouts),  TRANS  =  1  for  1964/65,
1972/73,  1973/74,  1974/75,  1977/78
and  1978/79
LIFT  Binary variable  for the introduction  of
the  Lower  Inventory  for  Tomorrow
Program LIFT = 1 for  1970/71
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